Early Experiments in Nation Building:

The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34

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November 2026

Abstract

While state-building is a standard tool of American foreign policy, the support for it came after a series of unpopular military occupations. How did these military disasters lead the U.S. to conclude that state-building was a policy goal? We investigate this question looking at state-building initiatives in Haiti during the occupation of 1915 to 1934. We use an intelligence report from 1932 with data on the political leanings of over 1,100 prominent citizens around the country. We find evidence that the occupation's counterinsurgency, road-building, and schooling projects were all associated with decreased opposition to the occupation.

Word Count (excluding references and appendix): 7,772

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State-building has long been a central, though contested, tool of American foreign policy. Historically, many of these efforts have been strategic attempts to shape political outcomes and foster alignment with U.S. interests, especially during the Cold War. But some of the earliest conceptions of state-building were embedded even earlier in military doctrines. In the 1940s, the U.S. Marines published the *Small Wars Manual*, codifying lessons from occupations in places like Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. These doctrines emphasized state-building interventions, such as building roads, schools, and hospitals, as essential for creating legitimacy and reducing resistance to occupation. Yet this raises a historical puzzle: the Marines developed doctrine advocating state-building after experiences in occupations that were, at best, cautionary tales rather than exemplary case studies of success. As a striking counterexample, after the Vietnam War, many American military officers believed nation building had been a harmful distraction (Fitzsimmons, 2008). Why, then, did the US codify an approach emphasizing infrastructure and institutional development when the occupations themselves seemed unable to yield clear successes?

In this paper, we examine the US's attempt at state-building in Haiti during the occupation of 1915-1934. After its initial counterinsurgency policy came under congressional scrutiny, the occupation decided in 1921 to focus on state-building. It built roads suitable for cars and expanded vocational training through new rural farm schools. While U.S officials claimed their projects were winning local support, others believed that

Haitians opposed the interventions. This paper seeks to empirically examine whether American officials would have seen evidence suggesting its state-building policies were generating political support on the ground.

To address this question, we collect novel archival data on individuals' feelings towards the occupation. We measure sentiment using a 1932 military intelligence report with mission-critical information on more than 1,100 prominent Haitians. We classify citizens as for or against the occupation based on the report's notes on each person's political affiliation and stance toward the occupation. These reports offer a more accurate picture of how officials viewed public opinion in Haiti than their public statements to Congress because they were confidential and operationally important. The reports also list the individuals' home district, which allows us to measure their exposure to three major U.S. policies: counterinsurgency operations, road construction, and school expansion.

We measure exposure to occupation policies through additional archival data. First, we classify a citizen as exposed to counterinsurgency operations if their home district contained at least one insurgent camp, using locations recorded on a 1920 military map. Second, we measure exposure to road construction using the change in market access caused by the roads. We calculate market access using 1930s tax revenue as a measure for local economic activity and a 1932 logistics table that gave district-to-district distances, travel times, and transportation methods. We recover the road construction's effect on market access by calculating the difference between observed market access and a

counterfactual that assumes the upgraded roads were not available. Finally, we measure exposure to school expansion by whether their district received a rural farm school, using locations from a 1929 report.

Since military and foreign policy doctrine relied on observed associations rather than experimental evidence, we first focus on correlations that occupation officials would have been able to observe. Our baseline empirical strategy compares support for the occupation between citizens at different levels of exposure to the projects. Nevertheless, it is easy to argue that any correlation is not a reflection of project success but instead a sign that projects were targeted based on pre-existing support. We address this endogenous placement issue by using vote counts from the 1918 constitutional referendum, which was heavily influenced by American coercion. We show that the votes in favor of the referendum frequently predict greater exposure to state-building projects, and that votes against it predict less exposure. Thus, we include specifications that control for pre-existing support and argue that the remaining relationships reflect the political feedback Americans believed their projects were generating.

Across all three measures of state-building, we find consistent evidence that greater exposure is associated with lower opposition to the occupation. Citizens living in districts that contained at least one insurgent camp were 13 percentage points less likely to oppose the occupation (not statistically significant in the baseline specification), consistent with the occupation's claims that these districts supported the counterinsurgency strategy. A

one-standard-deviation increase in market access is associated with a 11 percentage point decline in opposition (significant at the 1% level), and the presence of a rural farm school corresponds to a 20 percentage point decline (significant at the 5% level). These magnitudes are sizable relative to the sample mean opposition rate of 25%. As expected, given concerns about endogenous targeting, controlling for pre-existing support reduces the estimated coefficients, though the signs and general patterns remain unchanged. Finally, because of concerns about simultaneous implementation, we estimate specifications that include all exposures simultaneously. The associations remain negative, substantial, and all are statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that each project is independently correlated with lower opposition. We further confirm the importance of the projects using specifications that include placebo treatments and outcomes, which produce the hypothesized null effects.

One concern about the data is that the intelligence reports, despite being mission-critical information, might not reflect the true feelings of the locals. For our question, we argue that the true feelings are not as important as the occupation's perceptions. Historians have documented cases in Haiti where the Americans believed an individual was in favor of the occupation while in secret he was acting against it (Alexis, 2021, p. 124). But we are not trying to identify the causal effect of the policies on sentiment. We are interested in whether the Americans believed there was an effect. If they saw a relationship between their policies and what they thought the locals felt, then that would

have been sufficient for informing future policy. Since we find a relationship, we argue that the Haitian experience laid an experiential foundation for the hearts and minds doctrine.

Our work aligns with the literature on development assistance and conflict. In a conflict between the state and insurgents, one of the key factors in determining the victor is which side can control the flow of information among civilians (Berman et al., 2011). Thus, one indicator that development projects increase state legitimacy is if they reduce violence. But the relationship between development projects and violence is highly contextual. Such projects reduce conflict when they are connected to the government's success (Crost et al., 2016), increase the opportunity cost of joining insurgents (Fetzer, 2020), or are designed in close collaboration with local communities (Dell & Querubin, 2018). Unfortunately, because insurgents are aware that they increase citizen support for the government, and because violence from insurgents does not necessarily increase support for counterinsurgency (Lyall et al., 2013), such projects sometimes increase violence as insurgents try to preempt them (Crost et al., 2014; Khanna & Zimmermann, 2017; Sexton, 2016). Even without direct effects on violence, development projects may increase legitimacy in conflict environments through citizens' perceptions. The evidence on this mechanism is still being studied: some work shows that aid during the occupation of Afghanistan increased citizens' faith in the state (Böhnke & Zürcher, 2013) and increased positive attitudes towards it (Beath et al., 2025), even when the aid did not materially improve the recipients' livelihoods (Lyall et al., 2020); while other work in

Afghanistan finds that aid reduces confidence in local government and increases sympathy for insurgents (Sexton & Zürcher, 2024). Our findings are consistent with findings on development projects improving perceptions, though they are perceptions filtered through the military's observations.

This paper also contributes to the literature on how effective public good provision can increase government legitimacy. The evidence for this is mixed (Mcloughlin, 2015). In contexts where a weak government is trying to expand its legitimacy, the citizens do not necessarily interpret the increase in projects as an increase in legitimacy, mostly because they do not even notice that the projects were implemented (Blattman et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2022). To increase legitimacy, projects need to be visible (Krause, 2024) or implemented effectively, which is more likely to happen in places where state capacity is already high (Blattman et al., 2022). Our findings are consistent with the literature, since investments in roads and schools would have been highly visible and executed well. But while these papers focus on increasing legitimacy of a sovereign government, we show that these projects are also effective in increasing legitimacy of an occupying government.

Insurgency, Information, and Development under Occupation

Haiti began in 1804 as a country of people willing to overthrow its government, and that tradition continued over the next century. After their coerced labor made St. Domingue one of the most productive territories in the West during the 1700s, the slaves of the French Empire revolted, gained independence, and started the nation of Haiti. But

ideological conflicts led to the assassination of Haiti's first president, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, in 1806, and the country split into the Republic of Haiti in the South and the Empire of Haiti in the North (Stieber, 2020). Revolts became a common event, often happening at the local level. Peasant farmers regularly revolted against the state to weaken its capacity to enforce coercive labor laws (Chochotte, 2018). But sometimes these revolts would extend beyond local boundaries and reach the national level. As a result, the leadership of Haiti was perpetually instable. From 1806 to 1915, 17 of Haiti's 24 presidents were overthrown by revolution (Schmidt, 1971, p. 26).

These national-level revolts triggered the US occupation of Haiti in 1915. In July 1915, a revolt against President Guillaume Sam, the seventh man to hold the presidential office in four years, left him dead in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The U.S., fearing the collapse of Haiti would give Germans the opportunity to gain a strategic foothold in the Caribbean, immediately landed Marines and started occupying the country. The Americans quickly faced resistance from Haitians, pushing them into what we would today call an asymmetric, information-centric conflict (Berman et al., 2018).

The conflict was asymmetric because the U.S. arrived with significantly more firepower. Upon landing, the Marines' first objective was to neutralize the revolts. They gained an early victory with a two-pronged strategy of (1) arms-buying/amnesty-granting and (2) direct attacks against militant groups (Long, 2016, p. 74; Schmidt, 1971, pp. 83–85). But after the initial insurgent suppression, resistance began to build again. By 1919,

the U.S. estimated there were 6,000-15,000 fighters resisting the occupation (Alexis, 2021, p. 88). Continuing the military campaign, the Marines complemented ground attacks with aerial bombs, making Haiti the first conflict where the U.S. used air force (Alexis, 2021, p. 128; Chochotte, 2018).

But the military advantage was insufficient because the conflict was information centric. The leader, Charlemagne Péralte, had effectively established a rival government, sending ministers around the country (Alexis, 2021, p. 84). In the face of such opposition, the occupation could not fight the insurgents without information from locals. American leaders pled with Haitians to find information on where the insurgents were located and what they planned to do (Alexis, 2021, pp. 93–96). Sometimes the requests were accompanied by threats to destroy homes, livestock, and crops of villages who were not cooperating (Alexis, 2021, p. 95). Other times, they were combined with bounties to reward cooperation (Alexis, 2021, pp. 115–116). These tactics had varying success, with some Haitians delivering mission-critical information while many others supplied useless or bad information (Alexis, 2021, p. 127).

Despite the non-traditional conflict, the Marines dealt a decisive blow to the insurgency with the November 1919 assassination of Péralte, but it is unclear whether they ever won the people. In the following year, Franklin D Roosevelt, who had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the initial occupation years, ran as the Democratic candidate for vice president. The occupation became an easy opportunity for Republicans

to discredit Roosevelt, and they began a senate investigation. In the congressional testimony, Americans claimed they had won the support of the average Haitian (U.S. Senate, 1922). But the occupation may have misinterpreted the natives' actions and intents (Alexis, 2021, pp. 89, 124). In 1922, the investigation, despite uncovering several abuses by U.S. military, concluded that the situation was too unstable to withdraw troops and extended the occupation.

The extension was accompanied by a shift in strategy, transitioning from a purely military campaign to development assistance. From 1915 to 1922, the occupation focused strategy on stabilizing the political situation with only nominal attention to economic development. Even though policy did not focus on development, stabilizing the political environment had an immediate effect on the economy (Palsson, 2023). When America committed to a long-term occupation, it began focusing on development policy and nation building. Two of the main policies were road construction and school expansion. Both created mixed responses from the population.

From the beginning of the campaign, the occupation focused on road construction. Construction included "well-drained trails which are sufficiently wide and which have grades and curves of a character to permit the passage of a motor vehicle," generally including a gravel surface but sometimes, on heavily-trafficked roads, an asphalt surface (State Department, 1929, pp. 62–63). The roads served two purposes. First, they improved military logistics in the occupation's initial phase. Second, during the second phase, it was

Figure 1. Cumulative road construction by the occupation, 1915-29



Source: State Department (1929)

part of the occupation's development package. "While there is still great need of improvement in the National and departmental roads, there is even greater need for opening up rich areas which are now accessible only by trails which are traversed with difficulty even by animal traffic" (State Department, 1929, p. 62). Cumulative road construction from 1915 through 1929 is given in Figure 1.

The roads had countervailing effects on drawing support for the occupation. On the one hand, they improved travel between districts and facilitated exchange. On the other hand, in the early occupation, the roads were constructed with corvée labor, and

this coercion was one of the primary drivers of insurgency (Schmidt, 1971, p. 100). Thus, we do not know the net effect of the roads on support for the occupation.

The occupation's other signature achievement was the creation and expansion of rural farm schools. While school attendance in Haiti was compulsory since at least 1912, in 1922 only about one in four children attended (Commission on Education in Haiti, 1930, p. 7). Furthermore, the schools focused on classical education, while the occupation believed that Haiti's education should center on vocational training (Schmidt, 1971, pp. 182–183; State Department, 1927, p. 70). Thus, in 1923, rural farm schools were established to support agricultural training. The government pushed for these schools to such an extent that the department of public instruction relinquished control of national rural primary schools in 1930 to get access to the larger budget (Haiti, 1932, p. 93). Enrollment for schools from 1924 through 1929 is reported in Figure 2.

The occupation believed these farm schools were generating significant support. "Perhaps more significant than any other development is the continued drift of public sympathy toward vocational and industrial education. Not only are men of affairs coming to recognize more and more the absolute necessity of teaching modern productive methods (both agricultural and industrial), but the young men themselves are learning the dignity of labor. They are discovering that the only sure road to personal prosperity lies in personal efficiency in some industrial line. This drift of sentiment is exhibited in the

Figure 2. Enrollment in rural farm schools, 1924-29



Source: State Department (1929)

greater attendance at all of the industrial and agricultural schools" (State Department, 1927, p. 40).

But the school expansion sowed the seeds for the occupation's end. In 1929, students at the occupation's flagship school in Damien walked out in protest and called for the resignation of the occupation's head of instruction (Schmidt, 1971, p. 196). This inspired other protests, culminating in a protest in Les Cayes in December 1929 where Marines massacred several protesters. The massacre became international news (Dalleo, 2016, p. 34), convincing the U.S. government that the occupation needed to come to a rapid end.

Today, the occupation is not regarded well. Most of the development projects did not endure after American withdrawal. For example, the roads quickly fell into disrepair because maintenance was too costly (Schmidt, 1971, pp. 233–234). But the memory of the abuses lasted. The one lasting contribution was the creation of effective military and gendarmerie personnel, a legacy that allowed political strongmen to more effectively control the country (Schmidt, 1971, p. 235). While the long-term opinions on the occupation are negative, we do not have a good understanding of how Haitians felt on the eve of the occupation's ending. Or, at least, we do not know what Americans thought Haitians felt.

Data and Descriptive Statistics

To explore the connection between occupation policies and political support, we collect data from several archival sources.

Political support

We collect data on political sentiments using an intelligence report written by the American occupation in the early 1930s. Since 1921, the occupation intelligence tracked "the reputation, influence, and attitude of all prominent Haitians toward the occupation" (Schmidt, 1971, p. 121). We collect our data from the 1932 report pl, which listed 1,112 prominent citizens around the country, and a 1934 supplement, which added another 40. The officials consistently tracked the citizen's age, residence, color, education, political

Table 1. Characteristics of prominent citizens

Feature	Mean
Anti-Occupation	0.25
Age	48.0
Black	0.44
Brown	0.33
Highly Educated	0.26
Derogatory Report	0.21

Notes: Sample has 1,131 prominent citizens. It is unclear whether citizens would agree with the classifications provided or if these are just the judgments of intelligence officers.

affiliations, and attitude towards the Occupation and government. They also included a biographical portion with discretionary details.

Two features of the data are crucial for contextualizing our analysis. First, the sample is intentionally unrepresentative of the average Haitian. The intelligence reports cover individuals the occupation believed were influential or strategically important ("prominent citizens"). Other reports reference these individuals alongside town infrastructure and security resources, suggesting they were central to operational planning. While not a random sample, these elites likely shaped public opinion (Garbiras-Díaz et al., 2024).

Second, the data reflect the Americans' perceptions, not necessarily Haitians' own views. That includes our dependent variable, anti-occupation sentiment, which, even if it was directly solicited, could misrepresent actual beliefs due to preference falsification

(Kuran, 1997). But it also affects classifications like race and education, which were recorded without standardized criteria. For example, the distinction between "Black" and "Brown" may reflect both skin tone and social cues filtered through American racial categories. While such subjectivity complicates interpretation, it also emphasizes our central claim: we are studying how American officials perceived their environment, and those perceptions are what informed the policies they developed.

The report tracked two variables on political sentiments. First, it had the citizen's attitude towards the occupation; second, it had the citizen's political affiliation. While the variables were reported separately, the values were not standardized and there are cases where the values appear switched. For our analysis, we classify a citizen as anti-Occupation if either the attitude or the political affiliation indicates a feeling or association opposed to the Occupation or the Occupation-controlled government. This includes an explicit declaration of "anti-occupation" or "anti-American," a description of "Nationalist," or it could be membership in the Union Patriotique, the primary political party organizing against the occupation. By this classification, as reported in Table 1, 25% of citizens were anti-occupation. Figure 3 maps the spatial distribution of anti-occupation sentiment. Most of the anti-occupation was in the Southern peninsula and in the North around Cap-Haitien.

Table 1 also lists some features of the prominent citizens, as reported by the Americans. Their ages ranged from 19 to 95, with the average citizen aged around 48. The intelligence reports described 45% of these citizens as Black and 32% as Brown. The

Figure 3. Map of anti-occupation sentiment and kako camps



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educational categories were not standardized, so in some cases there are explicit categorizations like "secondary" or "college," but in other cases it says "mediocre," "good," or "very good." We classify anyone with a secondary education or higher, or anyone classified as "very good," as highly educated. Table 1 reports 27% fell in this category.

We also use information from the short, discretionary biographies included on each citizen. Since the officials determined what was relevant to the biographies, we could not extract consistent information on the citizens. For example, officials commonly mention birthplace, but we found it in only half of the reports. We also tried to extract comments on the citizen's position towards the Occupation, but we found that even when an official

coded someone as anti-Occupation, they did not always include biographical information to support it.

While we cannot consistently use the biographies to inform us about the citizens, we can use them to learn about the Americans. We are interested in derogatory comments, which are distinct from negative information that may have served an intelligence purpose. For example, the report could say that the person is not trustworthy, which could be relevant to the mission without being derogatory. But sometimes the character traits are described with more disparaging language, such as, "He is two-faced and Bolshevistic." Officials also recorded allegations about personal conduct, including extramarital affairs and gambling. Such allegations may have had a factual basis, but officials' decisions to include them could also reflect their own perceptions and biases. We use a large language model to classify whether the biography contains a derogatory comment (the prompt and model details are included in the appendix). Table 1 shows that 21% of reports contained something derogatory.

1918 Referendum

We also collect data on the 1918 constitutional referendum. In 1917, the Americans tried to push a reform through the National Assembly to allow foreigners to own land. When it failed, the Americans dissolved the National Assembly and in 1918 held a referendum. The results reported 98,993 votes, of which 98,225 voted in favor and only

Figure 4. Reported voter turnout in the 1918 referendum



Source: See text.

768 voted against. The extremely lopsided vote was a result of American intervention and Haitian protests, as discussed below in our Empirical Framework section.

We use vote district-level vote tallies found in the Marine archives which report the total number of yes and no votes by district. Despite the credulity of the election, the data still serve two purposes. First, the "yes" votes are indicative of the occupation's ability to mobilize supporters. Second, even though the occupation reported only 768 votes against the referendum, taking a stand against the Americans was costly, so those votes are informative about opposition to the occupation. The spatial distribution of reported voter turnout is shown in Figure 4.

Kako camps

We digitize a map of insurgent camps created by the Marines in 1923 (Intelligence Unit Gendarmerie d'Haiti 1923). The map charted the location of 87 camps, shown in Figure 3. With the exception of one camp in the North, all camps were located in the mountains in the East.

Road Building and Market Access

One of the occupation's biggest nation-building projects was building roads. The importance of roads is not just having direct access to an improved road, but the network of connections that road opens. We hypothesize that the most important impact of these roads is their effect on market access. We measure market access for district i as

$$MA_i = \sum_{i \neq j} e^{-\theta \tau_{ij}} M_j.$$

where M_j is the size of the market in district j, τ_{ij} is the travel time between between district i and j, and θ is a parameter that controls how quickly market access decays with travel time. Roads affect market access through τ_{ij}.

We measure the effect of roads on τ_{ij} using a logistics table from the marine intelligence report. The logistics table reports three key variables. First, it gives the distance between all districts in the same department. Second, it gives the travel time between all districts. Finally, it gives the transportation methods one needs for each trip. For example, Port-au-Prince is 95 km from Jacmel, and one can travel the entire distance

in a car in 3.0 hours; Cornillon, on the other hand, is only 63 km from Port-au-Prince, but one must use a mix of car and horseback, so the trip takes 7.5 hours. We calculate the market access variable using the travel times reported in this logistics table for τ_{ij}. To get the effect of the roads, we calculate a counterfactual market access variable that assumes there are no cars. Using the trips within a department that use only horseback, we calculate the average travel speed. Then we use that horseback speed and calculate the time it would take to travel the distance of each trip, giving us a counterfactual, no-car travel time. We then calculate the market access variable again using the counterfactual travel times.

The other pieces of the market access variable are derived either from data or by assumption. For market size (M_j), we use average annual district-level tax collections from 1925 to 1931 as a proxy for economic activity. We do not have data to estimate the decay function parameter (θ), so we have to rely on some assumptions. This parameter describes how important a market τ hours away is relative to the home market. We assume that a market at the median travel time (5.5 hours) is half as important as the home market, which gives us $\theta = 0.13$. In the appendix

The distributions of the true and counterfactual market access values are reported in Figure 5. Roads had the largest effect on the bottom half of the distribution. Many districts that would be relatively isolated because of long travel times on horseback became effectively closer to their neighboring districts through cars. The top of the distribution,

Figure 5. Market access distribution: true vs counterfactual



on the other hand, saw only a little change. As one would expect, the biggest markets were already close to other markets.

Schools

The other significant nation-building project was the expansion of schooling. The occupation pushed vocational education through rural farm schools. We use a 1929 report from the government department running the schools (Technical Service of the Department of Agriculture and Professional Education, 1929) to identify the location of 22 farm schools. We define treatment as an indicator for whether the district received a rural farm school.

We can also look at the expansion of non-occupation schools. We collect the total number of national urban, national rural, and Presbyterial schools, as well as enrollment and average attendance for two years of the occupation: 1922 (Commission on Education in Haiti, 1930) and 1931 (Haiti, 1932). The data's timing is convenient for using it to measure the shift in education during the occupation. While the 1922 numbers come 7 years into the American occupation, they represent the state of schools when the Americans switched their strategy from establishing stability to promoting development (Palsson, 2023). The 1931 data come at the same time that the intelligence report was collected, making it the most relevant for the opinions.

The non-farm schooling data were reported by school districts. Since we do not know the distribution of schools across political districts within each school district, we assign the school district numbers to each political district. For example, the 24 schools reported in the Saint Marc school district in 1931 are attributed to Saint Marc, and the same 24 are assigned to both La Chapelle and Verrettes.

Empirical Framework

We aim to understand the relationship that U.S. occupation officials could plausibly observe between their policies and local political sentiment. While modern policy evaluation often seeks causal effects, causal identification is not necessary for understanding how doctrine developed. Instead, we ask whether the Americans would have seen evidence that their state-building efforts were associated with greater support

for the occupation. We treat these associations not as proof of impact, but as the empirical patterns that could have informed their beliefs.

Our empirical goal is to look at how support for the occupation varied by exposure to the occupation's policies. To do this, we run the following regression:

$$Support_{id} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Exposure_d + \Gamma X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}$$

$Support_{id}$ is the support for the occupation by prominent citizen i in district d. We measure support as whether the intelligence report assesses the citizen as having anti-occupation or anti-government feelings, or if they are associated with parties that are anti-occupation. $Exposure_d$ is the treatment variable and measure's district d's exposure to a nation-building policy. We investigate three policies: (1) counterinsurgency against the Kako camps; (2) road construction; and (3) schooling expansion. Since various factors influence whether someone opposes the occupation, we also include a series of demographic and district controls, X_{id}. The individual controls include the citizen's age, education, and reported race. The district control is the log-distance to Les Cayes, the source of the 1929 massacre that made international news and hastened the end of the occupation. Since exposure is at the district level, and since there is a spatial correlation in where policies were located, all regressions use Conley standard errors, adjusting for spatial correlations within 20 km. The coefficient of interest is β_1, the difference in anti-occupation sentiment between citizens living in districts more exposed to the policy and those living in districts

that were less exposed. Since the outcome is whether the individuals held anti-occupation sentiments, the policy would be considered a success if β_1 is negative.

While we are not interested in identifying a causal effect, there are two factors that would confound even the learning aspect of an observed correlation. First, the occupation may have placed projects according to pre-existing sentiment. It may have rewarded districts that already supported it, or it may have tried to garner support in areas where it was low. If such targeting occurred, officials would have known the correlation was not a sign of program success but an artefact of program design. Second, there is the concern that the occupation intelligence report did not reflect actual sentiments but instead was a piece of propaganda. There is evidence that the intelligence officers believed they had the support of individuals who were covertly working against the occupation's interests (Alexis, 2021, p. 124). If there was a correlation between projects and support, it may have been artificial. As in the first case, officials would have been aware of the factors driving the observed correlation and would not have learned from it.

We address these concerns with the 1918 constitutional referendum. The referendum was a vote to eliminate the ban on foreign property ownership, and the occupation pushed to guarantee the result. Ahead of the vote, it suspended its use of coerced labor and even sponsored local barbecues to garner support (Schmidt, 1971, p. 99). But it also threatened to arrest Haitians who publicly opposed the measure. This pressure was significant enough that it co-opted the local journalists, with articles

appearing the day after the election condemning the opposition as deserters and unpatriotic.[1] After the referendum, the National School of Medicine dismissed six of its professors for voting against the constitutional reform (Logan, 1930, p. 450).[2] Thus, it is not surprising that the official counts show that 99% of voters supported the amendment, with 72% of districts reporting no votes opposed.

We use district-level data from the election to measure pre-project sentiment. Since the occupation suppressed the opposition, the results do not measure the true feelings towards the occupation. But we argue there are two variables that still signal local feelings. First, the number of "yes" votes in each district, conditional on population, reflects the occupation's ability to mobilize supporters. Second, the 28% of districts who registered at least one opposition vote show that there were locals with strong enough convictions against the occupation that they were willing to risk the threats of reprisal.

In Table 2, we examine the relationship between these two variables from the 1918 election and the outcomes and treatments in this paper. In the first column of the first panel, we show that there is a weak relationship between the 1918 votes and the 1934 anti-occupation sentiments. The coefficient on "yes" votes is positive, as we would expect, but it is not statistically significant. But the coefficient on any "no" votes is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Despite the election manipulation, the results

[1] *Le Matin*, 13 June 1918, "La Constitution Nationale"

[2] The professors were later reinstated by President Dartiguenave at the insistence of the minister of public instruction, M. Dantès Bellegarde (Logan, 1930).

Table 2. Pre-existing sentiment and project placement by district

A. Main Specification	Anti-Occupation	Any Camps	Δ ln(MarketAccess)	Any Farm Schools
ln(Votes Yes)	-0.04	0.004	0.16**	0.051
	[0.066]	[0.054]	[0.068]	[0.058]
Any No Votes	0.15*	0.14	-0.58***	0.094
	[0.081]	[0.12]	[0.15]	[0.10]
ln(Population)	0.03	-0.036	0.16	0.14***
	[0.046]	[0.063]	[0.10]	[0.052]
N	100	100	100	100

B. Placebos	Non-Farm Schools			Derogatory Reporting
	Δln(Schools)	Δln(Enrollment)	Δln(Attendance)	
ln(Votes Yes)	0.056**	0.092***	0.088**	0.050***
	[0.024]	[0.033]	[0.040]	[0.018]
Any No Votes	-0.026	-0.14*	-0.15**	0.0029
	[0.046]	[0.075]	[0.062]	[0.034]
ln(Population)	0.048*	0.077*	0.14***	-0.048**
	[0.027]	[0.040]	[0.038]	[0.024]
N	100	100	100	100

Notes: The level of observation is the district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

have some information about local sentiment 16 years later. We do not find a relationship between the 1918 votes and the location of the kako camps where counterinsurgency operations would take place. But the remaining columns in Table 2 show that the "yes" votes predict more market access, schools, enrollment, and attendance, while the "no" votes predict less.

Thus, in addition to the baseline specification, we also estimate an augmented specification:

$$Support_{id} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Exposure_d + \beta_2 \ln(Yes\ Votes_d) + \beta_3 AnyNo_d + \Gamma X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}.$$

This specification controls for the pre-project sentiment using the district-level 1918 election results. These controls for the pre-period should absorb the variation caused by project targeting, meaning the β_1 is a better approximation of what the occupation learned from the intelligence reports.

Finally, we also explore specifications with placebo treatments and a placebo outcome. These specifications address two concerns. First, even though we use the augmented specification to account for project targeting, the exposure variables could be correlated with unobserved factors that also affect anti-occupation sentiment. Thus, we have a specification that uses a placebo treatment—exposure to changes in non-farm schooling—that should also be correlated with those factors but unconnected to occupation policies. Second, there is the concern about the reports being a greater reflection of the Americans than the Haitians. The exposure variables could be correlated with American experiences with Haitians which then biases their perceptions of how Haitians support them. Thus, we include a specification with a placebo outcome—derogatory reporting—which is correlated with American perceptions but should be unrelated to the occupation policies.

Results and Discussion

Exposure to Occupation Policies

Our main results are reported in Figure 6. We will discuss each treatment individually, but because we use the same specifications across each one, it is easier to explain the figure in one place. For each treatment, the first specification is the baseline, indicated by the black circle, and includes the measure of district d's exposure, the full set of individual-level demographic controls, the district's population, and the distance from Cayes. The second specification, indicated by a red triangle, is the same specification but also includes the 1918 referendum controls. Then, as we discuss in further detail below, because the treatments happen together, we also have a horse race specification that puts all three exposure measures in the same regression. These are indicated by the blue square (baseline horse race) and the green diamond (horse race with the 1918 controls). All regressions use Conley standard errors to account for spatial correlations between individuals in the same district and across neighboring districts.

For counterinsurgency operations, our treatment of interest is a dummy for whether the district had a kako camp, but we also include an analysis using the number of kako camps in the appendix. The baseline specification shows that citizens in a district with any camps were 13 percentage points less likely to oppose the occupation, though this difference is not statistically significant using Conley standard errors. When we control for the 1918 voting behavior, the coefficient by increases 8% to 14 percentage points and

Figure 6. Relationship between occupation policies and anti-occupation sentiment



Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. All regressions contain the full set of demographic controls, district population, and the distance from Cayes. The first set of estimates (black circle) come from the baselines specifications. The second estimates (red triangles) add the 1918 referendum controls. The third set (blue squares) are from a horse-race specification with all three policies included, and the final set (emerald diamonds) is the horse-race with the 1918 controls. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals based on Conley standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are reported in the appendix.

is statistically significant at the 10% level. But the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant.

While the results' statistical significance is only moderate, the size and direction are noteworthy. It is natural to think that the insurgents placed their camps in areas sympathetic to their cause. But the intelligence reports show that these areas were less likely in the early 1930s to have prominent citizens who opposed the occupation. There

are a few interpretations of these results. First, the prominent citizens might not represent the average citizen. Second, since finding camps required the help of locals, the map might reveal where citizens were most sympathetic to the occupation. Finally, the citizens in these areas might secretly oppose the occupation but publicly support it to deter the Americans from further invasive actions.

Next, we discuss the relationship between occupation sentiment and the changes in market access due to road building. In the baseline specification, the coefficient for the log change in market access is -0.21. This means that a one standard deviation increase in market access (0.72 log points) is associated with a 15 percentage point decrease in anti-occupation sentiment, significant at the 1% level. Adding controls for the 1918 referendum reduces the magnitude of the one-standard deviation increase to an 11.1 percentage point decline in anti-occupation sentiment, consistent with the political targeting of the projects, but it is still significant at the 1% level.

The schooling results are reported in the third grouping. If a district received a rural farm school, citizens in that district were 21 percentage points less likely to oppose the occupation, significant at the 5% level. After controlling for the 1918 referendum, the coefficient shrinks to 17 percentage points, consistent with the targeting hypothesis, but it is still significant, this time at the 1% level.

One concern about the empirical results is that statistically significant findings across all three projects may indicate that the implementation of the projects were

correlated. It might have been easier to create a farm school in a district that had also received improved roads. Thus, the separate regressions do not adequately control for the total package of projects the district received.

To address this concern, we run a horse race specification that includes all three treatments. The results show that all three projects remain statistically significant, even when the 1918 controls are also included. The kako camps' coefficient increases in magnitude, such that the presence of a camp is associated with a 16 percentage point decrease in anti-occupation sentiment, now statistically significant at the 5% level. The results for change in market access remain the same. And the coefficient for the presence of a farm school drops from 17 percentage points to 13 percentage points, though this is still significant at the 1% level. The changes to the coefficients for kako camps and farm schools show that the exposure variables are connected, and failing to account for this simultaneous exposure biases the estimates. But it is also evidence that it was not the general characteristics of the district that were related to both receiving a project and being less opposed to the occupation but that each project was important.

Placebo Exposure and Outcome

We next assess our research design with two placebo specifications. We start with the specification that uses a placebo exposure and conclude with a placebo outcome.

We first look at the relationship between anti-Occupation sentiment and improvements in non-farm schools. The Occupation promoted rural farm schools, and even

Figure 7. Placebo Treatment - Anti-occupation sentiment and non-farm schools



Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. All regressions contain the full set of demographic controls, district population, and the distance from Cayes. The first set of estimates (black circle) come from the baselines specifications. The second estimates (red triangles) add the 1918 referendum controls. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals based on Conley standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are reported in the appendix.

opposed non-farm schools to a degree, so improvements in the non-farm schools should not have led Haitians to support it. Yet non-farm schools did increase in number, enrollment, and attendance. Because these increases could reflect local economic conditions or broader government policy, they provide a useful test for unobserved local trends. If they also predict lower anti-Occupation sentiment, then our main exposure variables may be capturing those trends rather than the effects of Occupation policy.

Figure 7 provides little evidence for that hypothesis. Across all three measures, we do not find a strong relationship between non-farm schools and anti-occupation sentiment. In the baseline specification, the only statistically significant placebo treatment is the change in attendance, which is significant at the 10% level. But after we add the 1918 controls, we see the magnitudes for all regressions shrink and no result is significant at conventional levels. These results reduce the concern that the main estimates reflect unobserved factors associated with educational expansion more generally. They are therefore consistent with the interpretation that anti-Occupation sentiment responded specifically to the Occupation policies we study.

The second placebo test addresses the concern that the anti-Occupation measure is a greater reflection of American perceptions than Haitians' feelings. Because the reports preserve only officials' assessments, we cannot distinguish the two directly. Our placebo outcome, therefore, is whether the citizen's biography has derogatory comments. Occupation policies should not systematically predict whether officials included derogatory remarks. If they do, officials' classifications of political sentiment may reflect broader subjective judgments rather than a distinct assessment of political opposition.

Figure 8 reports the results of replacing the dependent variable with the indicator for the derogatory comments. There is no systematic relationship with the occupation policy exposure variables. Biographies of citizens in districts with kako camps are somewhat more likely to contain derogatory comments, but the estimate is not statistically

Figure 8. Placebo Outcome - Occupation policies and derogatory reporting



Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual's biography contained derogatory comments. All regressions contain the full set of demographic controls, district population, and the distance from Cayes. The first set of estimates (black circle) come from the baselines specifications. The second estimates (red triangles) add the 1918 referendum controls. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals based on Conley standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are reported in the appendix.

significant at conventional levels. Larger improvements in market access and the presence of a farm school are associated with fewer derogatory comments, but these relationships are statistically significant only in some specifications and only at the 10 percent level. Taken together, the estimates provide little evidence that policy exposure systematically shaped officials' broader assessments of residents. This result strengthens the interpretation that the main estimates capture differences in anti-Occupation sentiment rather than a general reporting bias.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has examined the puzzle of how the U.S. developed a doctrine for cultivating soft power after a series of poorly executed military occupations. Using intelligence reports from the Haitian occupation of 1915 to 1934, we find that occupation officials perceived that beneficiaries of counterinsurgency and development programs were more likely to support the occupation. While we do not claim a causal effect, we argue that the correlation would have given the Americans reason to believe that soft power was a worthy policy goal.

Not only do the results contribute to the intellectual history of state-building in conflict and post-conflict countries, they help us understand the role of process legitimacy and performance legitimacy in interventions. The US occupation of Haiti failed to establish process legitimacy: the Haitian presidents were widely seen as American puppets, and in 1918 the occupation dissolved the legislature and manipulated a plebiscite to amend the constitution. This paper suggests that the elite evaluated the occupation not on process but on performance. This is consistent with evidence in other contexts that citizens value state-building projects when they are visible, effective, and noticed (Blattman et al., 2017, 2022; Khan et al., 2022; Krause, 2024).

This paper contributes to the intellectual history of foreign policy. It uses empirical evidence from one of the United States' earliest major interventions in another country. Researchers are exploring the early interventions for policy lessons. For example, the U.S.

annexation of Puerto Rico involved several development projects with varying outcomes: the overall intervention seems to have improved conditions in the country (Marein, 2020), yet specific programs did not achieve their objectives (Marein, 2022). Similar evidence from other cases—including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and the Philippines—would help clarify which interventions succeeded in generating political support, which failed, and whether development projects translated into durable legitimacy for foreign-backed governments. Such comparisons could move the debate beyond whether interventions produced economic change to the broader question of how state-building efforts shape political attitudes among the populations they seek to govern.

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Appendix

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Composition of Anti-Occupation Sentiment

Our primary outcome is whether the citizen is identified as being opposed to the Occupation. While sometimes the official includes an explicit label of "anti-Occupation," there are many other labels that would have also signified that the citizen was opposed. Our measure aggregates all such labels, but it is helpful to understand what goes into it. In Table A1, we list the labels that we identified as anti-Occupation, a short rationale for why we counted that as anti-Occupation, and the share of citizens labeled anti-Occupation that had that label. Note that the shares add up to 1.36. This is because each citizen gets two labels (attitude and political affiliation) and some citizens had multiple anti-Occupation labels applied to them. The total exceeding 1.0 is reassuring because it shows the categories are related.

Table A1. Composition of Anti-Occupation Sentiment

Attitude or Political Affiliation Label	Reason for Including it as Anti-Occupation	Share with that Label
Anti-Occupation	Explicit label	0.325
Nationalist	Ideology centered on Haitian identity and opposed to American occupation	0.254
Vincentist	Supporter of Stenio Vincent, who ran for president on an anti-Occupation platform	0.226

Radical	Used to describe actors whose activities or views were perceived as threatening to the Occupation	0.148
Opposition	Explicitly labeled as part of the opposition	0.088
Anti-Government	Explicitly labeled as anti-Government, which was backed by the Americans	0.081
Doubtful	For those with a doubtful attitude towards the occupation	0.081
Anti-American	Explicitly labeled as anti-American	0.046
Unfriendly/Unfavorable	For those with an unfriendly attitude towards the occupation	0.046
Bad	For those with a bad attitude towards the Occupation	0.032
Union Patriotique	Members of a party tasked with reminding the world that Haiti was occupied	0.025
Hostile	For those with a hostile attitude towards the occupation	0.004

Classifying Biographies with LLM

To classify the citizen biographies, we batch uploaded in June 2026 the biographies and use OpenAI's GPT-5.4-mini (gpt-5.4-mini-2026-03-17) with the following prompt:

```
You are coding 1932-1934 US intelligence reports about prominent
Haitian citizens for historical research. Analyze only the supplied
HISTORY. Do not use outside knowledge.

CURRENT OPPOSITION

Classify currently_opposed as binary 0/1. This means the report
depicts the person as currently opposed to the US Occupation, US
authorities, Marines, the Garde, institutions closely identified with
the Occupation, or the Haitian government in power at the report date.

The research concept includes indirect political coding in the report.
Current descriptions such as nationalist, radical, agitator,
Bolshevist, revolutionary, anti-Garde, anti-Occupation, or comparable
oppositional labels support a current opposition classification when
the report frames them as present attributes. Politically motivated
surveillance, arrest, dismissal, exclusion, or politically disparaging
reporting may also support current opposition when the context
connects the person to present opposition against the Occupation or
the current Haitian government. Ordinary political activity alone is
not necessarily opposition, but oppositional political activity is.

Code currently_opposed=0 when opposition is clearly limited to an
earlier Haitian government or former administration, or when the
report only gives past offices, ordinary party activity, personal
criticism, poverty, criminal conduct, appearance, or personal
```

immorality. Do not infer current opposition solely from unrelated negative character reporting. When timing is genuinely unclear, use the report's framing and return your best binary judgment without inventing facts.

opposition_probability is an uncalibrated 0-1 score for currently_opposed. opposition_basis identifies the kinds of evidence used. opposition_evidence must contain short exact excerpts from HISTORY. Give concise reasoning.

DEROGATORY REPORTING

Independently classify whether the reporting officer uses derogatory reporting about the person. Code narrowly. Mission-relevant adverse information is not automatically derogatory: statements about influence, trustworthiness, loyalty, political reliability, competence for office, criminal record, surveillance, or opposition can be strategically important intelligence when stated in a neutral or specific way. For example, "has no political influence", "is not trustworthy", "is unreliable", "has been under surveillance", or "was convicted of theft" are adverse but not derogatory by themselves.

Code report_derogatory=1 when the report goes beyond neutral adverse intelligence and uses disparaging language, moralizing characterization, personal insult, ridicule, or impertinent exposure of private failings. Include slurs or loaded labels about character, honesty, intelligence, competence, morality, criminality, appearance, ideology, or social worth when the wording demeans the person rather than simply reports an operational fact. Examples that should count include "two-faced", "braggart", "intriguer", "insupportable temperament", "will do most anything for money", "capable of any evil", and unnecessary allegations of affairs, gambling, drunkenness, or similar personal morality failings unless the history clearly ties the detail to a public office, security risk, or concrete mission-relevant event.

When deciding, focus on wording and pertinence, not whether the fact is negative. A terse negative assessment can be non-derogatory if it is operationally relevant and not demeaning. A personally demeaning way of conveying the same information is derogatory. A neutral adverse fact without judgment is not by itself derogatory. Political disparagement may inform both measures; unrelated personal disparagement does not establish current opposition. Return exact evidence excerpts.

BIRTHPLACE

```
Extract birthplace only when HISTORY explicitly says the person was
born in a place or is a native of it. Do not infer birthplace from
residence, education, employment, travel, or relatives. Preserve the
place wording exactly.

Every evidence excerpt must be copied as one exact, contiguous
substring from HISTORY. Do not correct spelling, change
capitalization, add or remove words, insert ellipses, or add quotation
marks around the excerpt unless those quotation marks occur in
HISTORY. If a positive classification has no supporting excerpt,
reconsider the classification rather than returning an empty evidence
list. Return only the requested structured data.
```

Robustness of Kako Camps

Our main specification measures exposure to counterinsurgency activity using a dummy for the presence of a kako camp. But the number of kako camps in a district varied greatly. In Appendix Table A2, we run the same regressions as Table 3 but set exposure to the number of kako camps.

Appendix Table A2. Relationship between number of kako camps and anti-occupation sentiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of Kako Camps	-0.014*	-0.014	-0.0192**	-0.0174**
	[0.0083]	[0.0084]	[0.0088]	[0.0088]
Δ ln(Market Access)			-0.20***	-0.15***
			[0.065]	[0.044]
Any Farm School			-0.13**	-0.13***
			[0.056]	[0.045]
1918 Controls		X		X
N	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131
R^2	0.27	0.32	0.35	0.36

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. All regressions contain the full set of demographic controls, district population, and the distance from Cayes. Conley standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sensitivity of Market Access

Our market access variable relies on the assumption of the decay function parameter (θ). Since we have no way to measure it, we assume that a town that is the median time away (5.5 hours) is half as important to the town's market access, which gives us an elasticity of $\theta = 0.13$. To test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we include a sensitivity analysis where we assume that a market size does not fall by half until it is the median counterfactual time away (11.6 hours), $\theta = 0.06$. We also try assuming that the importance falls by half at the 25th percentile true travel time (3.0 hours), $\theta = 0.23$. The results are in Appendix Table A3. The magnitude of the coefficient is sensitive to the decay parameter, but the overall pattern holds.

Appendix Table A3. Sensitivity analysis for decay function parameter θ

	$\theta = 0.06$		$\theta = 0.23$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ ln(Market Access)	-0.39***	-0.28***	-0.15***	-0.11***
	[0.15]	[0.087]	[0.053]	[0.032]
1918 Controls		X		X
N	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131
R^2	0.27	0.32	0.35	0.36

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. All regressions contain the full set of demographic controls, district population, and the distance from Cayes. Conley standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Full Regression Tables

Appendix Table A4. Relationship between occupation policies and anti-occupation sentiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Any Kako Camps	-0.13	-0.14*					-0.16**	-0.16**
	[0.078]	[0.077]					[0.074]	[0.071]
Δ ln(Market Access)			-0.21***	-0.16***			-0.20***	-0.15***
			[0.077]	[0.046]			[0.062]	[0.046]
Any Farm School					-0.20**	-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.13***
					[0.08]	[0.05]	[0.060]	[0.049]
log(Yes Votes)		-0.0408		-0.021		-0.0214		-0.00843
		[0.0515]		[0.0515]		[0.0539]		[0.0460]
Any No Votes		0.251**		0.145		0.220**		0.14
		[0.105]		[0.106]		[0.107]		[0.0858]
Age	-0.00024	-0.00023	-0.00078	-0.00063	-0.00016	-0.0002	-0.0007	-0.0006
	[0.00122]	[0.00127]	[0.00148]	[0.00140]	[0.00125]	[0.00133]	[0.00130]	[0.00125]
Race: Black	-0.0031	0.0115	-0.0119	-0.00588	-0.00937	0.000883	0.0113	0.0174
	[0.0545]	[0.0496]	[0.0518]	[0.0490]	[0.0502]	[0.0479]	[0.0453]	[0.0466]
Race: Brown	-0.0378	-0.0219	-0.0437	-0.0367	-0.0189	-0.011	-0.00894	-0.00224
	[0.0558]	[0.0477]	[0.0457]	[0.0451]	[0.0450]	[0.0428]	[0.0349]	[0.0364]
Education: High	-0.0866	-0.048	-0.0663	-0.0501	-0.0629	-0.0355	-0.0496	-0.0358
	[0.0596]	[0.0442]	[0.0446]	[0.0396]	[0.0525]	[0.0449]	[0.0473]	[0.0434]
log(Distance to Cayes)	-0.0127	-0.00177	-0.0175	-0.011	-0.0183	-0.0091	-0.0152	-0.0094
	[0.0148]	[0.0152]	[0.0125]	[0.0158]	[0.0132]	[0.0155]	[0.00960]	[0.0122]
log(Population)	0.0382	0.0419	0.0891***	0.0801**	0.104***	0.0890**	0.107***	0.0898**
	[0.0405]	[0.0342]	[0.0305]	[0.0401]	[0.0371]	[0.0363]	[0.0299]	[0.0371]
Constant	0.0172	0.109	-0.278	-0.188	-0.533	-0.389	-0.401	-0.306
	[0.447]	[0.361]	[0.309]	[0.301]	[0.381]	[0.334]	[0.275]	[0.262]
N	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131
R^2	0.28	0.33	0.27	0.32	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.37

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. Conley standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table A5. Placebo Treatment - Anti-occupation sentiment and non-farm schools

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ ln(Non-Farm Schools)	-0.09	-0.06				
	[0.18]	[0.17]				
Δ ln(Non-Farm Enrollment)			-0.05	-0.002		
			[0.09]	[0.10]		
Δ ln(Non-Farm Attendance)					-0.17**	-0.11
					[0.09]	[0.08]
log(Yes Votes)		-0.037		-0.0398		-0.0322
		[0.0597]		[0.0574]		[0.0558]
Any No Votes		0.242**		0.243*		0.213*
		[0.123]		[0.125]		[0.119]
Age	-0.00026	-0.00025	-0.00025	-0.00023	-0.00037	-0.00032
	[0.00128]	[0.00133]	[0.00130]	[0.00134]	[0.00135]	[0.00135]
Race: Black	-0.0178	-0.00526	-0.0177	-0.00494	-0.00491	0.00158
	[0.0574]	[0.0496]	[0.0578]	[0.0493]	[0.0551]	[0.0504]
Race: Brown	-0.0419	-0.0307	-0.0453	-0.0351	-0.0202	-0.0182
	[0.0623]	[0.0550]	[0.0597]	[0.0526]	[0.0499]	[0.0492]
Education: High	-0.0801	-0.0462	-0.0848	-0.0502	-0.081	-0.0511
	[0.0619]	[0.0437]	[0.0584]	[0.0432]	[0.0514]	[0.0400]
log(Distance to Cayes)	-0.0141	-0.00462	-0.0131	-0.00538	-0.00896	-0.00249
	[0.0143]	[0.0166]	[0.0148]	[0.0165]	[0.0166]	[0.0174]
log(Population)	0.0611	0.0605	0.0628	0.056	0.101**	0.0857**
	[0.0449]	[0.0376]	[0.0478]	[0.0440]	[0.0435]	[0.0408]
Constant	-0.205	-0.0933	-0.211	-0.0344	-0.54	-0.32
	[0.494]	[0.457]	[0.509]	[0.491]	[0.437]	[0.428]
N	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131
R^2	0.27	0.32	0.27	0.32	0.29	0.32

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual opposed the occupation. Conley standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table A6. Placebo Outcome - Occupation policies and derogatory reporting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Kako Camps	0.020	0.015				
	[0.038]	[0.042]				
Δ ln(Market Access)			-0.070*	-0.058		
			[0.041]	[0.037]		
Any Farm School					-0.077	-0.077*
					[0.051]	[0.045]
log(Yes Votes)		0.0206		0.0274		0.029
		[0.0318]		[0.0325]		[0.0324]
Any No Votes		0.0772		0.0416		0.0673
		[0.0479]		[0.0360]		[0.0437]
Age	-0.00084	-0.00093	-0.00102	-0.00108	-0.00081	-0.00092
	[0.000936]	[0.000960]	[0.000908]	[0.000933]	[0.000947]	[0.000965]
Race: Black	-0.0421	-0.0367	-0.0381	-0.0353	-0.0368	-0.0323
	[0.0422]	[0.0413]	[0.0394]	[0.0391]	[0.0378]	[0.0373]
Race: Brown	-0.00916	-0.00339	-0.0055	-0.00251	0.00429	0.00917
	[0.0385]	[0.0371]	[0.0345]	[0.0345]	[0.0327]	[0.0331]
Education: High	-0.0885*	-0.0816*	-0.0812	-0.0813*	-0.0788	-0.0746
	[0.0523]	[0.0482]	[0.0506]	[0.0491]	[0.0537]	[0.0508]
log(Distance to Cayes)	0.0216***	0.0238***	0.0215***	0.0221***	0.0211***	0.0225***
	[0.00641]	[0.00593]	[0.00586]	[0.00585]	[0.00621]	[0.00565]
log(Population)	0.0418	0.0197	0.0527	0.0273	0.0603*	0.0336
	[0.0378]	[0.0364]	[0.0356]	[0.0354]	[0.0355]	[0.0347]
Constant	-0.218	-0.179	-0.256	-0.222	-0.363	-0.329
	[0.380]	[0.324]	[0.360]	[0.311]	[0.363]	[0.301]
N	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131
R^2	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual's biography contained derogatory comments. Conley standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05, * p<0.1